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WO distinguished and extensive literatures have developed during
the past century. First, scholars have explored the normative and
positive implications of tax base choice. Perhaps the most promi-
nent branch of this literature centers on the comparison of accretion and
consumption taxes.1 At the same time, economists have produced an ex-
tensive literature on macroeconomics that includes consideration of the
* Professor of Law and Helen L. Crocker Faculty Scholar, Stanford University. I am
grateful for useful comments from Joe Bankman, Louis Kaplow, participants in the
Harvard Law School Seminar on Current Research in Taxation, and participants in the
faculty workshop at Stanford Law School. All errors are my own responsibility.
1. See, e.g., William D. Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal In-
come Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1113 (1974); Alvin Warren, Would a Consumption Tax Be
Fairer Than an Income Tax?, 89 YALE L.J. 1081 (1980).
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impact of taxes on short-run fluctuations and long-run growth. 2
There has been some cross-fertilization in these literatures. Most
prominently, economists have studied the economic growth implications
of the choice between accretion and consumption taxes in general equi-
librium models.3 In addition, macroeconomic models that consider short-
run fluctuations sometimes distinguish between capital income and labor
income taxes. 4 Despite these instances, the macroeconomics literature
ignores many of the detailed differences between different tax bases.
This article attempts to deepen the cross-fertilization between
macroeconomics and tax base theory. Part I presents some basic
macroeconomic background. Part II considers the macroeconomic impli-
cations of various tax bases: an accretion tax, a realization-based tax simi-
lar to the current U.S. system, a cash flow income tax, and various hybrid
systems. Part III summarizes the discussion in Part II, presents some
qualifications, and states some goals for future research.
This article is conceptual. I do not proceed by formally embedding
taxes in one or more formal macroeconomic models. Ultimately, this
step is necessary since it is reasonable to expect that taxes will trigger
complex intertemporal interactions that affect current and future prices.
The informal approach used in this article means that most or all of the
conclusions about the macroeconomic side effects of various tax bases in
Part II are very tentative.
I. MACROECONOMIC BACKGROUND
A. A BRIEF REVIEW OF SOME MAJOR MACROECONOMIC THEORIES
Prior to the Great Depression in the 1930s, macroeconomics was not a
distinct economic field. The idea that the national or world economy
might sustain long and costly bouts of unemployment or underutilization
of capital resources absent government restraints on the price and market
system was foreign to most economists. What we now call the "classical"
view of macroeconomics was prevalent: Prices would adjust in goods, la-
bor, and capital markets rather quickly to clear those markets. Sustained,
"involuntary" unemployment would not occur. There was no reason to
have a distinct field called "macroeconomics." Microeconomic price the-
ory would explain aggregate outcomes. This view lead to the so-called
"classical dichotomy," the idea that nominal prices and the nominal
2. See, e.g., N. GREGORY MANKIW, MACROECONOMICS (4th ed. 2000); DAVID
ROMER, ADVANCED MACROECONOMICS (1996).
3. See, e.g., ALAN J. AUERBACH & LAURENCE J. KOTLIKOFF, DYNAMIC FISCAL POL-
ICY (1987); Kenneth L. Judd, The Impact of Tax Reform in Modern Dynamic Economies, in
TRANSITION COSTS OF FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM (Keven A. Hassett & R. Glenn Hub-
bard eds., 2001).
4. See, e.g., R. Anton Braun, Tax Disturbances and Real Economic Activity in the
Postwar United States, 33 J. MONETARY ECON. 441 (1994); Jeremy Greenwood & Gregory
W. Huffman, Tax Analysis in a Real-Business-Cycle Model: On Measuring Harberger Tri-
angles and Okun Gaps, 27 J. MONETARY ECON. 167 (1991); Ellen R. McGrattan, The
Macroeconomic Effects of Distortionary Taxation, 33 J. MONETARY ECON. 573 (1994).
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money supply could have no effect on the real economy: real output, em-
ployment, or interest rates. 5
The full-blown classical viewpoint fell out of favor in the face of the
Great Depression, which involved many years of sustained high levels of
unemployment and underutilization of capital resources. "Keynesian"
theories (and the distinct field of macroeconomics) evolved, relying heav-
ily on nominal rigidities, the failure of nominal prices to change quickly
enough to clear markets. These theories suggest a role for government
that extends beyond merely providing a legal structure in which markets
can operate effectively. In particular, governments may use fiscal and
monetary policy to "stabilize" the economy. Since prices are sticky, gov-
ernments will face inflationary environments where aggregate demand
exceeds aggregate supply and "recessions" where aggregate demand falls
short of aggregate supply, resulting in "involuntary" unemployment and
falling nominal prices.
Fiscal policy involves influencing aggregate demand by adjusting gov-
ernment spending or taxes. Thus, in the face of a recession, the govern-
ment might enact a tax cut or a temporary increase in government
spending to stimulate aggregate demand. Monetary policy involves gov-
ernment manipulation of the money supply. When nominal prices are
sticky, nominal injections of money will stimulate aggregate demand. In
modern economies, monetary authorities often target interest rates or in-
flation rather than the money supply itself. But, achieving the targets
involves changes in the money supply. For example, the Federal Reserve
Board ("the Fed"), the monetary authority in the United States, targets
the Federal funds rate. If the rate is above the target, the Fed will
purchase Federal debt obligations in so-called "open market operations,"
driving rates down and injecting money into the economy-and thereby
increasing the nominal money supply. These open market operations
have been very effective at moving the Federal funds rate to the Fed's
target rate. 6
As Keynesian theories evolved, economists blended in elements of the
classical approach. The idea was that Keynesian models describe the
short-run but that prices adjust in the long-run. In the 1980s, "real busi-
ness cycle" models evolved. These models are often called "neoclassical"
because they do not rely on nominal rigidities. The models study the
propagation of various shocks (especially technology shocks) in an econ-
omy where prices adjust instantaneously. Fluctuations occur because net
5. See MANKIW, supra note 2, at 186-87.
6. See ROMER, supra note 2, at 396-97, 417. It is worth emphasizing that this high
degree of effectiveness pertains only to nominal rates. Many studies question whether
macroeconomic policy instruments can have any more than a temporary effect on real
rates. See id. at 225-26 (summarizing arguments by some economists that in the long run,
real variables are impervious to policy instruments such as the money supply); Marianne
Baxter & Robert G. King, Fiscal Policy in General Equilibrium, 83 AM. ECON. REv. 315,
320-22, 324-25 (1993) (temporary and permanent shifts in government purchases cause
only a temporary change in the real interest rate).
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investment and similar aggregates can adjust only gradually to the shocks.
The models can explain much (but not all) of the observed fluctuations in
aggregate economies. Major weaknesses of these models include the
heavy reliance on technology shocks and the failure to incorporate mone-
tary shocks and other phenomena associated with nominal rigidities. 7
Recent work has attempted to augment the models in a way that captures
monetary shocks, aiming toward a "New Neoclassical Synthesis."' 8
Although this article will not include sophisticated modeling, the dis-
cussion in Part II does assume some familiarity with the most basic mod-
els. To that end, the next two subsections examine a simple Keynesian
model and discuss in more detail how real business cycle models work.
1. A Simple Keynesian Model
Perhaps the best-known elementary Keynesian model is the "IS-LM
Model."9 This model is based on three relationships:
Y = C(Y, T) + I(r) + G IS Equation
M / P = L(rY) LM Equation
P =P Prices Fixed
where the symbols stand for the following variables:




M nominal money supply
L money demand function
P price level
I investment
r the nominal interest rate.
The first equation is called the IS equation because it can be rewritten
in "investment/saving" form: I = Y - C - G = S where S is saving. This
equation expresses the idea that savings must equal investment in a
closed economy. The second equation equates the real money supply
with the demand for real balances.
The IS and LM relations determine aggregate demand for a given price
level in a way that is described below. The intersection of the aggregate
demand curve and the aggregate supply curve in price/output space de-
termines the price level and the level of output. The diagram below has
two separate aggregate supply curves. One, labeled "SRAS," represents
7. For a more complete discussion, see ROMER, supra note 2, at 186-89.
8. See, e.g., M. GOODFRIEND & ROBERT G. KING, THE NEW NEOCLASSICAL SYNTHE-
SIS AND THE ROLE OF MONETARY POLICY (1997).
9. This model is a staple of elementary texts. See ROBERT J. BARRO,
MACROECONOMICS 757-802 (1997); MANKIW, supra note 2, at 256-311. The notation and
equations in the text follow the development of the model in the Mankiw textbook. For a
briefer, more advanced introduction, see ROMER, supra note 2, at 195-205.
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"short-run aggregate supply." This curve is horizontal, capturing the
Keynesian idea that prices do not adjust in the short-run.10 The second
aggregate supply curve is labeled "LRAS," and represents both the classi-
cal view and the long-run under the Neo-Keynesian view. Under the
classical view, output is determined by the supply of capital, the supply of
labor, and the available technology. Thus, there is a "natural" level of
output. In the diagram, this level is two units. Under the Neo-Keynesian
view, in the long-run prices are flexible, and output will revert to the
"natural" level. The long-run aggregate supply curve ("LRAS") will be
vertical, as in the diagram.
The diagram has two aggregate demand curves, labeled "ADI" and
"AD2." The latter represents a higher level of aggregate demand. Taking
these curves as sequential in time, the shift from AD1 to AD2 may be the
result of government policy (increasing G, government spending, or re-
ducing T, taxes) or may arise from various demand shocks (e.g., an in-
crease in consumption or investment due to increased consumer or
investor confidence). Assuming the shift is due to government policy,
analyzing the impact of the shift illustrates both the classical view and the
Neo-Keynesian view. Under the classical view, output is fixed at the
"natural" level (2 in the diagram). The change in government policy sim-














1 2 3 4
Y (Output, Income)
10. The third of the three IS-LM model equations above embodies this idea.
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sian view, initially output is depressed, being somewhat less than 1.5 as
determined by the intersection of AD1 and SRAS. The government poli-
cies inflate aggregate demand enough to move output up to the "natu-
ral" rate, as determined by the intersection of AD2 and SRAS. Under
the Neo-Keynesian view, in the absence of government intervention, out-
put would correct itself but only with a delay. Prices would adjust but
only in the long-run. The economy would move down along the AD1
curve until output reached two units. The SRAS curve would shift down
accordingly.
In the IS-LM model aggregate demand is the critical factor. Aggregate
demand is determined by solving the IS and LM equations for r (the in-
terest rate) and Y (output) given fixed values for M (nominal money sup-
ply), G (government expenditure), T (taxes), and P (the price level).
One then varies P, obtaining different values of Y for each P, thereby
determining the aggregate demand curve in P-Y space. The operation of
the IS-LM framework becomes more transparent if we assume that the IS
and LM relationships are linear. In particular, let us rewrite these rela-
tionships as:1 I
Y= [a + b(Y- T)] + [c - dr] + G IS Equation
M P = eY- fr LM Equation
where the coefficients a, b, c, d, e, and f are positive and come from as-
suming the following linear relationships for consumption, investment
and the demand for money:
C = a + b(Y- T) Consumption
I(r,Y) = c - dr Investment
M / P = eY- fr Demand for Money
The coefficient b is the marginal propensity to consume out of income,
e represents the sensitivity of money demand to income, and f represents
the sensitivity of money demand to the interest rate. 12 Given these linear
relationships, one can solve for Y in terms of P and obtain a reduced form
equation:
Linear Reduced Form Equation:
z(a+c) z -zb d M
- + G+-T+
1-b 1-b 1-b (1-b)[f+del(1-b)] P
where
11. The notation and the final expressions here are from Mankiw's textbook. For the
details of the derivation, see MANKIW, supra note 2, at 307-10.
12. Two tendencies underlie the intuition behind the money demand equation. First,
people will require more money when income is higher since transaction volume will in-
crease. Second, people will economize on money balances when interest rates are high,
preferring to hold funds in interest bearing accounts instead of in cash. Thus, e and f are
positive.
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fZ =
f+del(1-b)
The coefficients on G and T are the "multipliers" that indicate the in-
crease in Y that results from an additional dollar of government spending
or tax reduction.
The following IS-LM diagram shows the (linear) IS and LM curves in r-
Y space. It is possible to see from this diagram how the IS-LM intersec-
tion generates the aggregate demand curve ("AD") in the diagram above.
The IS and LM curves in the diagram indicate the combinations of r and
Y representing equilibrium in the goods and money markets, respectively,
for fixed values of M, P, T, and t. Decreasing T or increasing G will shift
the IS curve out. Increasing M or decreasing P will shift the LM curve
down. Fixing M, G, and T while varying P will shift the LM curve around
and generate a Y value for each P value chosen. These (P,Y) pairs will
generate the aggregate demand curve. In the diagram, there are two LM
curves, LM-1 and LM-2. If M is fixed, LM-2 represents the LM curve for









I I I I | I
0 1 2 3 4
Y (Output, Income)
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LM-1 to LM-2. A similar shift would result if we held P constant and
increased M, the nominal money supply.
An increase in government spending or a decrease in taxes will shift
the IS curve out. The following diagram illustrates such a case. The IS
curve shifts from IS-1 to IS-2, causing interest rates and output to
increase.
2. Neoclassical Models
A major weakness of the IS-LM approach is that it does not model how
the aggregate results emerge from individual behavior. If aggregate rela-
tionships change due to changes in individual behavior, the approach will
not predict the results. As mentioned above, "neoclassical" real business
cycle models evolved in the 1980s. These models use individual optimiza-
tion as a starting point and include multiple periods. Households choose
their intertemporal labor allocation, invest in capital, and consume each
period in order to maximize expected utility discounted over all future
periods. Labor and capital are paid their marginal product. No price ri-
gidities are present. Technology evolves stochastically, and aggregate la-
bor, capital, and technology combine to determine output in each
period. 13
















Since these models have a rich intertemporal structure, they capture
the impact of wealth changes that result from various government poli-
cies. To lay a basis for discussion later in the article, it is useful to work
through the case of a permanent increase in government expenditure.
This increase decreases the output available for private investment and
consumption and therefore decreases private wealth (the discounted pre-
sent value of private income). Individuals respond by decreasing con-
sumption and leisure, but the increase in labor input increases the
marginal product of capital and induces an increase in investment. In the
long-run, capital and labor inputs increase, and output is higher. This
"capital amplification" effect can cause output to increase by more than
the increase in government expenditure. 14
A temporary increase in government expenditure (e.g., during war-
time) tends to have very different effects. Individuals realize that the in-
crease is temporary, and they will dissave to cushion the drop in
consumption necessitated by the increased share of the government in
national output. Investment declines as a result, in contrast to the in-
crease observed in the face of a permanent increase in government ex-
penditure. Lower investment reduces the capital stock. After the period
of high government expenditure is over and labor resources are freed up
to produce goods for private consumption, the marginal product of capi-
tal is high due to the depleted capital stock. An investment boom fol-
lows, and the economy gradually reverts to its state prior to the
temporary increase in expenditure. The absence of a "capital amplifica-
tion" effect in the temporary increase case means that output increases
less per dollar of additional government expenditure than in the case
where the increase is permanent.1 5
It would be interesting to analyze the implications of different tax base
choices for macroeconomic policy using a neoclassical model that in-
cludes nominal rigidities and allows for monetary shocks. For simplicity,
I limit discussion in this article to somewhat speculative consideration of
the likely results that would follow in a more basic neoclassical model,
similar to the real business cycle models of the 1980s and early 1990s.
The conceptual yield from this approach provides a good starting point
for future work using more sophisticated models.
B. THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS
The institutional environment is particularly important in any study of
the impact of tax rules on macroeconomic policy. Monetary and fiscal
policy are not instantaneously effective. Scholars have identified two
kinds of lags that operate as institutional constraints on the execution of
macroeconomic policy. First, there is "inside lag," the time it takes for
14. For an extremely clear, rigorous development of these results and the correspond-
ing results for a temporary increase in government expenditure, see Baxter & King, supra
note 6, at 319-26.
15. See id. at 325-26.
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the government to identify a macroeconomic problem and respond with
an appropriate policy. Second, there is "outside lag," the time it takes for
the policy change to affect the economy.
In the United States, the Fed implements monetary policy. At the pre-
sent time, the Fed undertakes this task by targeting short-run interest
rates, using open market operations to move the federal funds rate to the
target value. The Fed meets formally every six weeks or so and is capable
of acting very quickly, even between meetings, if necessary. 16 Fiscal pol-
icy (adjusting taxes and/or government spending) usually requires action
by Congress with the assent of the President. As a result, the institutional
aspect of inside lag is much more serious for fiscal policy.17 Enacting tax
legislation can take several quarters or even years, and it is often an acci-
dent that a particular fiscal measure goes into effect with the right
timing.18
Deliberate adjustments to macroeconomic policy involve delay. A co-
rollary is that the macroeconomic impact of the existing structure of tax,
fiscal, and monetary rules is very important. Two closely related features
of government policy are particularly significant: "automatic stabilizers"
and the "environment effect." Automatic stabilizers are policy elements
that create a macroeconomic response in the absence of any deliberate
action by a policymaker. A frequently cited example is the fact that in-
come tax collections drop "automatically" when income falls during a re-
cession. 19 In effect, the structure of the law creates a tax reduction that
tends to stimulate aggregate demand in the face of a shortfall. Of course,
automatic responses may be destabilizing as well as stabilizing.
A second feature is that government policy itself operates in a legal
environment that cannot be changed quickly or easily. A good example
is U.S. monetary policy. Although the Fed can act quickly, it must take
the legal environment as a given, at least in the short-run. This environ-
ment includes the existing tax rules. These rules may hinder or advance
the monetary efforts of the Fed. This "environment effect" is central to
the discussion in the next Part. Choosing a tax base and developing a
regulatory structure to implement that tax base takes considerable time,
and the system develops a momentum of its own. As a result, choosing a
tax base involves a commitment that will constrain the faster acting as-
pects of government policy that are the logical candidates for addressing
16. As one prominent macroeconomist notes, "all the Fed Open Market Committee
needs to do is have a conference call, vote, and transmit its decision to the New York
trading desk where the short-term interest rate is changed." John B. Taylor, Reassessing
Discretionary Fiscal Policy, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 21, 27 (2000).
17. The "economic" aspect of inside lag, the delay in recognizing macroeconomic con-
ditions that require a policy response, is a difficult problem for the Fed as well as for
Congress. The Fed has accumulated top notch and very deep resources for studying and
tracking economic fluctuations. Nonetheless, the Fed often faces considerable uncertainty
with respect to the near-term direction of the economy.
18. See Taylor, supra note 16, at 27, 34.
19. See, e.g., MANKIW, supra note 2, at 533; Alan J. Auerbach & Daniel Feenberg, The
Significance of Federal Taxes as Automatic Stabilizers, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 37 (2000).
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short-run fluctuations. These aspects include fiscal as well as monetary
policies. It is plausible that Congress might act quickly to cut rates inside
an existing tax system in response to short-term macroeconomic condi-
tions. It is not plausible that Congress would be able to shift the entire
nature of the tax system in a short enough time frame to respond
effectively.
A convenient conceptualization that emerges from these considera-
tions is that we can assume that tax base choices are fixed in the short-
run. Deliberate fiscal policy responses to macroeconomic conditions will
consist primarily of changing the rate structure or the level of government
expenditures. Similarly, monetary authorities must operate in a setting
where the tax base is fixed. They may hope to elicit a short-run rate
change from fiscal authorities, but they cannot expect that the fiscal au-
thorities will be able to change the nature of the tax system itself in the
short-run. I rely on this conceptualization in the subsequent Parts of this
article.
An interesting corollary emerges from this discussion. Suppose that
changing rates under two different tax bases has dramatically different
macroeconomic effects. It might be advantageous to deliberately mix tax
bases (e.g., combining a VAT with an income tax) so that the legislature
could choose which tax rate to adjust depending on the macroeconomic
problem. Section II.D. develops this idea in more detail.
It is important to emphasize that these institutional constraints are sali-
ent only because of the short-run nature of macroeconomic problems. If
there is a shortfall in aggregate demand and the world has some Keyne-
sian features, a delayed government response means that some potential
output is lost forever.
II. MACROECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF
VARIOUS TAX BASES
Sections A and C examine the two leading theoretical tax bases: the
accretion tax and the cash flow income tax. Each of these sections begins
with an exposition of some basic features of each tax that have significant
macroeconomic implications. This exposition includes the neoclassical
implications expected to follow from the basic features.20 Both sections
conclude by examining the short-run tendencies of the tax bases in a
Keynesian framework. Section B goes through the same steps for a reali-
zation-based tax similar to current U.S. law. Section D discusses the use
of hybrid tax systems. In doing so, it deepens the discussion of the three
tax bases treated in the earlier sections. Some of this deepening is the
result of going beyond certain unrealistic aspects of the Keynesian frame-
work employed in the earlier sections.
20. Because we are using a framework based on the traditional neoclassical model that
does not incorporate nominal rigidities or monetary shocks, the discussion is limited to the
impact of fiscal policy. Studying monetary policy effectively requires more complex neo-
classical variants that include nominal rigidities and monetary effects.
2003]
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A. THE ACCRETION TAX
1. Basic Features and Neoclassical Implications
A pure accretion tax has a "mark-to-market" feature, imposing or re-
bating taxes based on changes in wealth as they occur, whether or not
these changes are "realized" through sale or other disposition of the un-
derlying asset. In contrast, a realization-based income tax, such as the
current U.S. system, does not tax losses or gains unless and until they are
realized. The "mark-to-market" feature of a pure accretion tax leads to
the Samuelson Theorem. 2' In its general form, this theorem may be
stated as follows: 22
SAMUELSON THEOREM: Under a pure accretion tax, the net present
value of any investment is independent of the tax rate. In addition,
that net present value will not change even if tax rates change in
expected or unexpected ways in the future.
Some important intuition underlying this result is evident from examin-
ing a perpetuity. Suppose that an investment pays $X per year forever
and that the pre-tax annualized interest rate is r. In the absence of taxes,
the present value of the investment is $X/r. Adding an accretion tax at
rate T reduces each annual dividend from $X to $X(1 - 7) and reduces
the discount rate from r to r(1 - T). The present value becomes:
X(1-7) X
r(1-T) r
The reduction in revenues is precisely offset by a drop in the discount
rate, leaving the present value the same. If we permanently change the
tax rate from T to some other value, T, at some future point in time, it
will not matter. The same offsetting effects will occur and the present
value will remain $X/r. On the other hand, macroeconomic policies or
macroeconomic shocks that affect X or r separately or differently will
impact the present value of the investment.
21. See Paul A. Samuelson, Tax Deductibility of Economic Depreciation to Insure In-
variant Valuations, 72 J. POL. ECON. 604 (1964). The result applies to risky as well as
riskless investments. See G. Fane, Neutral Taxation Under Uncertainty, 33 J. PuB. ECON. 95
(1987).
22. Samuelson stated the theorem in terms of "depreciation" and depreciating assets,
but, as he notes, the result also applies to appreciating assets. Samuelson, supra note 21, at
605-06.
Although Samuelson stated that his result "presupposes a tax rate that is uniform over
time for each person," the result applies when tax rates change over time. Id. at 605. Net
present value for an asset at time t is simply an integral from time t to a terminal time, T,
when last cash flow from the asset occurs. Id. (equation (3)). Suppose that the tax rate
changes at some intermediate time, t*. The integral becomes the sum of two integrals, one
from t to t* and the other from t* to T. The Samuelson Theorem clearly applies to both
integrals separately. They will have the same value regardless of the tax rate that applies.
As a result, the sum also will be invariant even in the case where different tax rates apply
to the two integrals. This argument obviously generalizes to the case where the tax rate
changes more than once during the period between t and T.
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It is evident that a pure accretion tax preserves the power to consume
presently in the face of government manipulation of tax rates by insulat-
ing the value of existing investments from future tax rate changes.2 3 At
the same time, the cost of future consumption relative to present con-
sumption is increased because the after-tax interest rate is lower. This
price change means that changes in tax rates will tend to cause intertem-
poral substitution effects, with rate increases leading to reduced saving
and investment. 24
The anticipated impact of the accretion tax in a neoclassical model fol-
lows from the features just delineated. Tax rate changes will not have a
direct (wealth changing) impact on investment but will have an impact
that arises from intertemporal substitution. Saving and investment will
fall in the face of higher rates. As a consequence, in the long-run, output
and the capital stock will be lower, wages will be lower, interest rates will
be higher, and the savings rate will be lower.25
2. Short-Run Implications
A first task is to examine the automatic stabilization properties of the
accretion tax. Consider two different kinds of shocks: a demand shock
that decreases demand and therefore decreases expected revenues for
each investment and a monetary shock that increases interest rates. In
each case, the shock will result in a drop in the present value of invest-
ments and, consequently, tax rebates. Assuming a Keynesian framework,
these rebates will have a stabilizing effect, tending to restore aggregate
demand in the face of the negative demand or monetary shock. 26
The flip side of these automatic stabilization policies is that explicit
monetary or fiscal policy initiatives will be frustrated. Consider the case
23. This insulation effect can serve as a commitment device for the government that
overcomes problems of time consistency for policies that stimulate investment on an econ-
omy-wide basis. If the government provides investment subsidies in period 1 and the in-
vestment actually occurs, there will be a temptation to tax the investment returns in later
periods. After the investment is sunk, these taxes have no welfare cost since they do not
influence behavior. However, if investors suspect that the government will raise taxes in
later periods in a way that affects investment value, they will not respond to the subsidies
in the first place. The nice feature of an accretion tax is that the government cannot affect
the value of the investments through future general tax rate increases. The ability to com-
mit to this tax base depends on the difficulty of amending the tax rules to change tax bases
at some later time.
24. Reduced savings and investment ultimately makes capital relatively scarce so that
wage rates fall relative to the return on capital. This outcome is a typical feature of income
tax variants (including the accretion tax) that reduce the after-tax return to capital.
25. See, e.g., AUERBACH & KOTLIKOFF, supra note 3, at 66 (neoclassical model com-
paring an income tax to a consumption tax).
26. In a traditional Keynesian model, aggregate demand is affected by nominal
changes, such as increasing the money supply, even though such changes might have no
effect in a rational expectations setting where prices adjust instantaneously. An important
issue is whether the rebates will happen quickly enough to have the requisite short-run
impact. In a system such as the current U.S. system, most wealth-holding taxpayers are
subject to quarterly estimated tax payments. An impact within three months would be
rapid enough on a macroeconomic timescale. Monetary and fiscal policy initiatives typi-
cally take six to eighteen months to affect the economy.
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where the government is using restrictive monetary policy to address ex-
cess demand.27 In the diagram below the initial IS and LM curves are
dotted lines labeled IS-1 and LM-1. The government contracts the
money supply, thereby shifting the LM curve up from LM-1 to LM-2.
This shift reduces output and raises the nominal interest rate. However,
under the accretion tax, investors receive tax rebates when a drop in in-
vestment value results from the interest rate increase. As a result of this
tax reduction, the IS curve shifts out from IS-1 to IS-2. This shift pushes
output back up and causes a further increase in the interest rate. Tax
rebates under an accretion tax will automatically soften the blow of a
contractionary monetary shock, but they also will dampen the impact of
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27. In recent years, the monetary authorities in the United States have been primarily
responsible for addressing short-run fluctuations. Discretionary fiscal policy has played
little or no part. See Taylor, supra note 16, at 27-28.
28. The various macroeconomic properties of the accretion tax suggest that it might be
an ideal tax system when citizens want to restrict the government's role in overseeing the
economy. The tax blocks any effect of tax rates on investment value and tends to offset
any attempt by the government to manage the economy in the short-run through fiscal or
monetary policy. In addition, the tax tends to stabilize the economy automatically in the
face of monetary or real shocks, reducing the need for government intervention.
The salience of this picture depends on which taxes are the subject of comparison. The
picture is particularly apt when comparing the accretion tax to a realization-based tax. It is
the mark-to-market feature of the accretion tax that is driving the macroeconomic effects
discussed so far. The realization-based tax is (approximately) equivalent to an accretion
tax without this feature.
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A final issue to examine is the impact on short-run policy effectiveness
of the (long-run and short-run) reduction in the after-tax interest rate
under a regime of accretion taxation. The easiest way to proceed is by
examining the coefficients of the Linear Reduced Form Equation
above. 29 The accretion tax reduces the interest rate by the proportion (1
- T). This reduction causes the coefficients d and f in the investment de-
mand and money demand equations to fall by the same proportion. But
changing d and f by the same proportion leaves z and all the coefficients
in the Linear Reduced Form Equation unaffected.30
However, there is another effect to consider. Taxes that reduce the
interest rate on an after-tax basis tend to reduce the savings rate.31 This
reduction means that the marginal propensity to consume, represented by
b in the Linear Reduced Form Equation, will be higher. The impact of a
higher marginal propensity to consume is to increase the efficacy of both
fiscal and monetary policy. 32
B. A REALIZATION-BASED TAX APPROXIMATING CURRENT U.S. LAW
1. Basic Features and Neoclassical Implications
Only a few elements of the current U.S. tax system resemble an accre-
tion tax. Certain financial market participants are taxed on a mark-to-
market basis. 33 In addition, the taxation of interest rate instruments has a
significant accretion-based component. 34 But most other investment ve-
hicles are taxed on a realization basis. The system also includes a step-up
in basis at death, allowing gains held until that time to escape taxation
entirely. Another departure from a pure accretion tax is the isolation of
investment gains and losses in a separate "basket." Only very limited
amounts of investment loss may be used to offset income other than in-
The comparison between the accretion tax and the cash flow income tax involves an
additional complication: The reduction in the saving rate under an accretion tax compared
to the cash flow income tax may increase the effectiveness of fiscal and monetary policy.
See infra text accompanying note 38.
29. See supra text following note 12.
30. This argument ignores the possible impact of a progressive rate structure. If in-
vestment demand is determined by individuals in higher brackets than those who are cru-
cial for the demand for money, the effect will be similar to reducing d more on a
proportional basis than f. This change in the coefficients will increase z and decrease the
coefficient of MIP in the Linear Reduced Form Equation. As a result, fiscal policy will be
more effective and monetary policy less effective than in the absence of the tax.
31. See, e.g., AUERBACH & KOTLIKOFF, supra note 3, at 66.
32. The algebra follows directly from the Linear Reduced Form Equation, taking into
account how b affects z. The intuition behind the result is obvious: If the marginal propen-
sity to consume is higher, then, in a Keynesian framework, putting a fixed number of dol-
lars into peoples' hands via fiscal or monetary means will result in a bigger increase in
consumption and a bigger feedback effect that increases national income.
33. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1236 (2002) (securities dealers); I.R.C. § 1256 (2002) (investors in
regulated futures contracts, foreign currency contracts, and nonequity options; dealers' eq-
uity option investments).
34. For example, interest is accrued and taxed on bonds issued at a discount (due to
coupons set at below market rates), a method that approximates accretion taxation. See




vestment gain.35 Losses that are not used currently may be carried for-
ward indefinitely, but they retain their character as investment losses.
In the face of all these rules, the optimal strategy at the personal level
is to hold gains until death to the extent possible and to accumulate an
inventory of losses to offset gains in situations where the gains must be
realized or where it is advantageous to do so for portfolio balancing or
other reasons. 36 A good first approximation at the personal level is that
debt instruments (which determine interest rates) are taxed, but other
investments are outside the tax system. No gains will be taxed for those
investments, and losses from the investments will have no tax value
(other than extinguishing the gains in certain instances). Since most in-
vestments will be in corporate form, we assume that there will be a corpo-
rate profits tax.
Under this approximation, the tax system will lower the after-tax inter-
est rate and will subject revenues to taxation on a cash flow basis as in the
case of an accretion tax. Unlike an accretion tax, however, gains and
losses on wealth holdings will not have any tax consequences. As a result,
the Samuelson Theorem will not apply.
The impact of this realization-based tax in a neoclassical model follows
from the (approximate) features just delineated. One feature will be sim-
ilar or the same as under an accretion tax: Tax rate changes will induce
intertemporal substitution. In particular, saving and investment will fall
in the face of higher rates; and, in the long-run, output and the capital
stock will be lower, wages will be lower, interest rates will be higher, and
the savings rate will be lower. However, there is a new twist associated
with the realization-based tax. Since the Samuelson Theorem does not
apply, tax rates changes will have wealth effects. Given that the expected
return on investment assets is positive, the average effect of this feature is
that taxes on gains will be deferred until revenue flows occur. As a result,
an increase in tax rates will cause an increase in the present value of
wealth holdings.37 This increase will have the usual effects in a neoclassi-
cal model: Individuals will increase consumption and leisure, moves
which tend to reduce output in the model. These effects will enhance the
effects that arise from intertemporal substitution.
35. See I.R.C. § 1211 (2002) (limitation on use of capital losses against other income;
no exception for corporations; limited exception ($1,500 to $3,000 per year) for non-corpo-
rate taxpayers).
36. For a technical discussion of loss-taking strategies, see George M. Constantinides,
Capital Market Equilibrium with Personal Tax, 51 ECONOMETRICA 611 (1983); Robert M.
Dammon & Chester S. Spatt, The Optimal Trading and Pricing of Securities with Asym-
metric Capital Gains Taxes and Transaction Costs, 9 REV. FIN. STUD. 921 (1996).
37. This result may seem strange, but there is a simple explanation. The realization-
based tax reduces the after-tax discount rate, which will increase present value for a typical
investment asset. In the case of an accretion tax, this increase is exactly offset by the
impact of taxing cash flow revenues and unrealized gains. The realization-based tax




The realization-based tax removes the tax rebates for unrealized losses
and the tax levies for unrealized gains that occur under the accretion tax.
In addition, it is approximately true that realized gains and losses have no
tax consequences. As a result, the automatic stabilization features of the
accretion tax are absent, but on the flip side, the rebates and levies do not
interfere with monetary or fiscal policy as they do in the case of an accre-
tion tax.
The reduction in the after-tax interest rate under the realization-based
tax will have the same impact as it does under the accretion tax. The
savings rate will fall, and the marginal propensity to consume will in-
crease. In a Keynesian framework, both monetary and fiscal policy will
be more potent.38
Tax theorists tend to view the realization requirement as a compromise
stemming from the practical desire to avoid having to value assets period-
ically, especially assets that lack an implicit valuation that is evident in
public markets.39 This compromise is costly because imposing a realiza-
tion requirement creates tax avoidance possibilities that the law must ad-
dress. For instance, the provisions that cabin investment losses along with
investment gains in an investment "basket" are necessary in a realization-
based system to block taxpayers from zeroing out their non-investment
taxable income by selectively realizing losses. Provisions of this sort,
though necessary, often complicate the tax laws. It is clear, however, that
a realization-based system may have some significant macroeconomic ad-
vantages compared to an accretion tax. Although the accretion tax cre-
ates some extra automatic stabilization compared to a realization-based
system, it also fetters discretionary government fiscal and monetary pol-
icy. If one views this trade-off as a net negative, then one might favor a
realization-based tax on macroeconomic grounds.
C. THE CASH FLOW INCOME TAX
1. Basic Features and Neoclassical Implications
A cash flow income tax has very different macroeconomic characteris-
tics from an accretion tax. The Samuelson Theorem applies for an accre-
tion tax so that the pattern of future tax rates will have no impact on the
present value of investments. In effect, the government cannot influence
investment value for good or for ill through tax-based fiscal policy, at
least in the short-run.40 In contrast, the cash flow income tax gives the
government tremendous power to influence the timing of investment.
38. See supra text accompanying note 32.
39. See MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
159-60 (3d ed. 1995) (characterizing the realization requirement as a "necessary evil").
40. Rate changes under an accretion tax will have a long-run (and ultimately signifi-
cant) effect on investment through its impact on intertemporal substitution. An increase in
tax rates will tend to reduce saving, lower the capital stock, and (in the long-run) increase
the required pre-tax return to capital. This required increased pre-tax return increases the
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Under this tax, investment cost is expensed initially and revenues are
taxed when they occur at the rate that prevails at that later time. An un-
anticipated temporary increase in tax rates will spur an investment boom.
Investments undertaken immediately will receive a much bigger tax bene-
fit since investment cost will be deducted when rates are high. Revenues
will flow in later, at the lower rate that prevailed prior to the temporary
increase.4'
It is instructive to contrast an unanticipated temporary increase with an
unanticipated permanent increase. A cash flow income tax at a perma-
nent rate T amounts to government ownership of the proportion T of all
assets in the economy. To see this point, consider the perpetuity of $X
per year forever when annual interest rates remain constant at rate r.
This perpetuity has a present value of $X/r on a pre-tax basis. A cash
flow income tax at rate T will reduce annual revenues to $X(1 - 1) from
$X but will have no impact on the interest rate. As a result, the present
value of the perpetuity will be $X(1 - T)/r instead of $X/r in the absence
of taxes. The tax has reduced present value by $XTIr, the present value
of the government's revenue stream. In effect, the government has pur-
chased or expropriated the proportion T of the perpetuity. The
"purchase" case occurs if the taxpayer invested in the perpetuity when
the cash flow rate was T. The taxpayer would have deducted the cost,
$X/r, receiving a payment (in the form of reduced taxes flowing from the
deduction) of $TX/r from the government. If the government imposed
the cash flow tax after the investment was made, the government will
have expropriated the proportion T of the investment by imposing the tax
without allowing a corresponding deduction for cost.
A permanent increase in cash flow tax rates expropriates wealth from
investors. If the increase is from T to T, then the government is expro-
priating a proportion (T - 7) of all wealth-holdings in the economy, in-
cluding human capital. If the tax rate increase is unanticipated, it will not
affect the incentive of the taxpayer to invest directly. The investor still
will earn r on new investments and on existing investments. There will be
an indirect effect, however, stemming from the sudden drop in private
wealth.
It is worth noting that these powerful fiscal tools also are fragile and
subject to time inconsistency problems. For example, a temporary rate
pre-tax discount rate for investments, allowing equilibrium to obtain with a smaller capital
stock.
41. Not all investments involve a single initial net outlay followed by revenues. But
the general idea still applies: Taxpayers will want to shift investment outlays into the high
tax period. Under a cash flow income tax with progressive rates, a temporary rate increase
will exacerbate or alleviate tax administration problems unless all rates increase by the
same number of percentage points. For example, if the spread between low bracket and
high bracket rates increases, there will be an added incentive for the high bracket taxpayer
to prepay for goods (including investment goods) purchased from the low bracket taxpayer
even if physical delivery of the goods is not accelerated. This prepayment results in an
earlier net tax benefit from the government when the two parties are considered together.
The net tax benefit is larger when the rate difference is larger.
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increase will induce an investment boom only if the temporary nature of
the increase is credible. The potential time inconsistency problem will
arise if after the new investment is on line, the rates are not dropped
down to their previous levels. This will result in the expropriation of pri-
vate wealth in a manner much like a lump sum tax, with no welfare conse-
quences. The optimal policy at that later time is not to decrease the rates
and to substitute the lump sum tax for taxes (such as taxes on labor in-
come) that are distortionary. If taxpayers anticipate this phenomenon
and the government cannot commit itself to the temporary increase ei-
ther mechanically or through a credible reputation-sensitive strategy,
then taxpayers will assume that the "temporary" increase is in fact per-
manent and the nice recession-killing investment boom will not take
place. Exploiting the fiscal power of a cash flow income tax requires a
high level of government maturity and credibility.
The impact of a cash flow tax in a neoclassical setting hinges on the
wealth effects of the tax. An unanticipated permanent increase in rates
will drop private wealth holdings. This drop will tend to decrease con-
sumption and leisure and increase output. However, raising rates on con-
sumption also will create substitution effects as taxpayers will tend to
substitute leisure for consumption at present and in all future periods.
The resulting drop in labor supply may offset the increase induced by the
wealth effect, and output may fall rather than rise.42
An unanticipated temporary increase in rates will induce an investment
boom as described above. There will be an important intertemporal sub-
stitution effect: Taxpayers will want to shift consumption from the present
to future periods when the tax cost is lower.43 This effect will make
"room" for the investment boom by giving scope for additional saving in
the short-run. There also may be some short-run substitution of leisure
for consumption. When rates revert to normal levels, there may be an
investment "bust" if the capital stock is artificially high and rates of re-
turn are depressed.
2. Short-Run Implications
Under a cash flow income tax, unrealized gains and losses have no tax
consequences. Thus, the extra degree of automatic stabilization and the
impediment to government monetary and fiscal policy that arise from the
42. An important point that emerges from this discussion is that distortions due to
raising tax rates can reverse the effects that stem from the drop in private wealth that
occurs because the added taxes take resources out of the private economy. For a more
developed example of the same phenomenon, see Baxter & King, supra note 6. Baxter
and King demonstrate that an increase in government expenditures financed by distortion-
ary taxes may create a significant drop in output even though an increase in government
expenditures financed by lump-sum taxes would significantly increase output. See id. at
327-28.
43. This intertemporal substitution effect on consumption in different periods is ab-
sent in the case of an unanticipated permanent rate increase. That increase has the same
impact on the after-tax price of both present consumption and future consumption, leaving
relative prices of consumption in different periods unchanged.
2003]
SMU LAW REVIEW
mark-to-market feature of an accretion tax will be absent under a cash
flow tax.
The cash flow income tax will result in a higher after-tax interest rate
than under an accretion tax or realization-based tax. As a result, the sav-
ings rate will be higher and the marginal propensity to consume will be
lower. In a Keynesian framework, the result will be that both monetary
and fiscal policy will be less potent.44
D. HYBRID TAX SYSTEMS
From a macroeconomic standpoint, hybrid tax systems have very inter-
esting and potentially useful characteristics. We will examine these char-
acteristics initially from a short-run Keynesian viewpoint. Consider a
system that applies a cash flow income tax to some taxpayers or asset
classes (the "CFIT sector") and an accretion tax to the rest (the "accre-
tion tax sector").
The accretion tax sector would be relatively immune to shocks because
unrealized losses and gains would have tax consequences. A shock with a
negative revenue impact in this sector would cause asset values in the
sector .to drop, leading to tax rebates. This sector also would be relatively
immune to government monetary and fiscal policy. Any action the gov-
ernment might take will be offset by increased taxes or tax rebates result-
ing from shifts in asset values.
The CFIT sector would not enjoy the same "automatic stabilization"
and immunity from government policy. Fiscal policy applied specifically
to the sector (e.g., temporarily increasing or lowering the cash flow tax
rate that applies to the sector) would have a very powerful impact on the
sector. However, this fiscal policy would impact investment flows to and
from the other sector. For instance, a temporary, one-year CFIT rate in-
crease would cause an investment boom in the CFIT sector. But some of
the induced investment in the CFIT sector might be at the expense of
investment in the accretion tax sector rather than being "new" net invest-
ment for the economy as a whole. The government would have to simul-
taneously lower tax rates in the accretion sector in order to prevent
outflow of investment from that sector. The tax rate drop may need to
(credibly) last more than one year. Otherwise, taxpayers might cannibal-
ize long-term investment in the accretion tax sector in order to take ad-
vantage of the temporarily low after-tax cost of long-term investment in
the CFIT sector. One way around this problem would be to combine the
temporary tax increase in the CFIT sector with a temporary investment
tax credit in the accretion tax sector. This investment tax credit might be
financed in whole or in part from the extra tax revenues flowing from the
44. See supra text accompanying note 32. Under a cash flow income tax, the addi-
tional saving and investment compared to an accretion tax or a realization-based tax will
gradually reduce the pre-tax rate of return. However, the steady state (long-run equilib-
rium) savings rate typically remains above the rate that would apply under an accretion or
realization-based tax. See, e.g., AUERBACH & KOTLIKOFF supra note 3, at 66.
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temporarily higher CFIT rate.45
The aggregate effect on economy-wide fiscal and monetary policy
would be a mixture of the effects from a pure accretion tax and a pure
cash flow income tax. The aggregate saving rate and the marginal pro-
pensity to consume under a hybrid tax would tend to be at values be-
tween the values that would obtain under either pure tax. One would
expect the effectiveness of monetary and fiscal policy to be impaired
more under the hybrid tax than under the comprehensive accretion tax,
but the impairment under the hybrid tax should be less than under a com-
prehensive cash flow income tax.46
The potential macroeconomic advantage of the hybrid tax comes from
the ability to place individuals or industries into different tax regimes.
Some sectors or individuals may have higher adjustment costs in the face
of demand or output fluctuations and may not be able to insure effec-
tively against such fluctuations. Similarly, there may be higher welfare
costs if particular identifiable classes of individuals face the consequences
of fluctuations without the ability to insure. It would make sense to as-
sign these individuals or industries to the accretion tax sector since that
sector is relatively immune to macroeconomic shocks and to the side ef-
fects of government fiscal and monetary policy.
In order to make the case that this type of policy has value, it is impor-
tant to take into account the availability of capital markets to individuals,
firms, and the government. It is useful to examine two different cases:
"Aggregate" fluctuations in output or demand that impact all sectors and
individuals (causing a global boom or recession) and "isolated" fluctua-
tions that primarily impact individual sectors. In the case of aggregate
fluctuations, capital markets would seem to provide adequate possibilities
both for insurance and for intertemporal smoothing. Consider a global
recession. The risk of such a recession is an aggregate risk that cannot be
diversified away, and, as a consequence, individuals or firms will have to
pay a premium to insure against that risk.4? Nonetheless, in a perfect
45. Revenues accruing during the high tax year from investments already in place at
the beginning of that year would be taxed at a higher rate. There is a problem that will
arise under a hybrid tax that would be absent under a comprehensive flat-rate CFIT.
Faced with a one-year temporary tax increase, taxpayers will be tempted to manipulate the
timing of cash flows to shift receipts out of the high tax year. Under a comprehensive flat-
rate CFIT, this maneuver will not work. Shifting a receipt out of the high tax year for the
receiving taxpayer removes a deduction in that year for the payor. If both taxpayers are
subject to the same rate, the manipulation will be a wash in aggregate. However, in a
hybrid tax setting, CFIT taxpayers could delay their receipts from accretion sector payors.
Delay of the payment will have at most a trivial effect (a time value of money impact over
the period of the delay which may be much less than a full year) on the accretion sector
payor but may result in a substantial tax reduction for the CFIT sector recipient. The
temporary rate increase in the CFIT sector makes this strategy temporarily more attrac-
tive. Cf. supra note 41 (rate gap critical to tax avoidance via payment timing under a com-
prehensive CFIT).
46. See supra text accompanying note 32.
47. Certain risks may be diversified away by everyone and therefore are not aggregate
risks. For example, suppose that a certain kind of accident afflicts a specified percentage,
p, of the population each year, that each accident causes damage of $X, and that the iden-
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capital market this premium will be minimized as the risk is passed to
individuals who are most willing to bear it and therefore will do so for the
lowest price. Furthermore, individuals and firms will be able to "undo"
the effects of taxation of the risky components of securities by adjusting
their portfolios if the government accommodates these adjustments by
shifting its own portfolio. 48 The government can accomplish this accom-
modation without affecting the risk-adjusted level of tax revenues. If pri-
tity of the afflicted party is entirely random. Insurance companies can pool these risks
together, collecting a annual premium from each person equal to the expected damage
$pX (plus a fee that is very small compared to $pX to induce the companies to provide the
risk pooling services) and then fully compensate all parties who are damaged. Each indi-
vidual will lose exactly $pX (plus a negligible administrative fee) and face no risk in terms
of economic outcomes. The insurance companies also will face no risk since they can aver-
age over large numbers of people. Their total payout will be the average amount of dam-
age multiplied by the number of insured clients, an amount that is known in advance.
A global recession is different. It is like an accident that may or may not happen to
everyone simultaneously-an aggregate risk. Capital markets pool this risk much like the
insurance company in the accident hypothetical just presented. But, pooling this risk does
not eliminate it. The insuring "group" (some collection of capital market participants)
collects "premiums" to bear the risk, but the outcome for that group depends on whether
the recession actually occurs. Aggregate risk may be shifted from one party to another,
but someone must bear the risk. As a result, aggregate risk is "priced" in the sense that
those individuals who wish to shed the risk will have to pay a premium (more than a
negligible administrative fee) to the individuals who take on the risk without protection.
At first glance, it might seem possible to diversify away the risks of a recession across
time. The idea is similar to the accident hypothetical: In any given year there is a
probability p of a recession that causes $X of lost output. In the face of such a recession,
the government can borrow to cover (l-p) times the loss. In years when there is no reces-
sion, the government can raise taxes by $pX, using the proceeds to pay down debt accumu-
lated from earlier recessionary years or to build up a fund for future recession relief.
Private sector income falls by $pX each year regardless of whether or not there is a reces-
sion. The government faces no risk since years with and without recessions will average
out over time, resulting in a balanced "recession insurance" budget.
This approach will not work if the loss of output from shocks is "persistent" or "perma-
nent" in the sense that output is lower in all future periods. In some simple
macroeconomic models, such losses are not persistent or permanent. The economy fluctu-
ates around a deterministic output trend. After the recession is over, output returns in
future years to the same level that would have occurred in each future year absent any
recession.
The problem is that economic growth tends to build at least in part upon earlier growth.
For instance, "learning by doing" may be a significant component of such growth. As firms
and individuals engage in production, they learn how to do it more efficiently. If there is a
recession and no doing, there is no learning during that period of time, and the learning
cannot be done "double time" in the next period. As a result, output falls in all future
periods. A mountain climbing analogy is apt. You can only climb so far in a given day. If
you take a day off and then resume your climb, you will be lower (by one day's climb) on
all future days. Various empirical studies find some degree of persistence, but the available
time series are not long enough for definitive results. See ROMER, supra note 2, at 175-80.
To the extent that output loss is persistent or permanent, diversification of the risk of reces-
sion across time is not possible.
48. An accretion tax would lower the excess return when an asset appreciated more
than the riskless rate of return. Individuals or firms could avoid any such effect on the
excess return in advance by borrowing to buy more of the asset. If the government sold
the asset short and did lending transactions in offsetting amounts, there would be no im-
pact on market prices. Risk (including downside risk) would reside with the individuals
and firms as if there were no tax. Risk-adjusted government tax revenues would be un-
changed. See Louis Kaplow, Taxation and Risk Taking: A General Equilibrium Perspective,
4 NAT'L TAX J. 789, 792-93 (1994).
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vate parties adjust their portfolios accordingly, the ultimate risk-bearing
parties will be the same whether or not there is an accretion tax.
This scenario where the accretion tax is not a useful policy tool rests on
two key assumptions. The requisite securities must be available in capital
markets, and individuals must deliberately and rationally choose their
portfolios. In the case of aggregate risk, the availability of the securities
is plausible. Worldwide recession would have a predictable impact on
equity and bond indexes that are surrounded by deep futures and options
markets. Even an amateur investor could use these derivatives to insure
in a rough fashion.49 The deliberation and rationality assumption is less
plausible. Even highly sophisticated individuals may not spend much
time planning their portfolios. If certain individuals who have significant
security and other wealth holdings that are not tax sheltered are under-
insured because they have failed to plan carefully, the government might
include them in the accretion tax regime so that the taxation scheme
would provide some level of insurance. To the extent the government
was in error concerning these individuals (i.e., the individuals intended
not to be completely insured), the individuals could (at some cost)
"undo" the government insurance scheme.
The case of "isolated" fluctuations is more interesting. Fluctuations in
output and employment may originate in particular sectors. Some sec-
tors, such as mining, construction, and agriculture, appear to be fairly iso-
lated in that shocks in these sectors do not readily spill over to affect
other sectors.50 Shocks are promulgated from sector to sector because
the output from some sectors are inputs for others. Shocks in sectors that
produce goods that are only minor inputs in other sectors will not impact
those other sectors very much. Thus, there could be a "recession" in one
of these sectors that is not reflected in the national or world economy.
For some of these sectors, there are readily available securities for insur-
ance purposes. For instance, in the United States it is easy even for farm-
ers who are not sophisticated traders to hedge using crop price futures
markets. Other sectors such as construction present difficulties. This in-
dustry is regional and much of it is privately held. It may be difficult even
for sophisticated parties to construct appropriate hedging portfolios.
Subjecting such sectors to accretion taxation may provide valuable insur-
ance services.
An interesting point that emerges from this discussion is that the accre-
tion tax may be most useful in the situations where it is hardest to imple-
ment. When the market value of a business is evident because it is
publicly traded, it is both easy to hedge and easy to implement an accre-
tion tax. Where public markets are absent it will be difficult to hedge,
49. It would be possible to insure more precisely using factor analytic techniques to
construct "single factor" portfolios that are highly correlated with world or individual
country GDP or some other desired indicator.




and it will be hard to implement an accretion tax because of the need for
periodic valuationin the absence of market prices.51
"Isolated" fluctuations may be of particular concern when worker skills
and physical capital are specific to a particular sector. In that case, capital
and labor cannot easily flow out of the sector and earn returns elsewhere
on a temporary basis if there is a downturn that is isolated to that sector.
The factors employed in the sector will suffer from any sectoral slump
without much ability to mitigate the losses. In the absence of deep and
accessible insurance markets, including these sectors in the accretion tax
column might be particularly desirable.
The mirror image arguments apply for imposing a cash flow tax on cer-
tain sectors. Sectors where losses are readily insurable, where parties are
sophisticated enough to secure the insurance, and where factors can eas-
ily shift out and be temporarily employed elsewhere are particularly de-
sirable targets for the powerful fiscal tools inherent in the cash flow
income tax. Letting these sectors bear the brunt of any adjustments will
minimize the adjustment costs of temporary reductions in employment
and capital usage and will minimize the welfare costs of inefficient risk-
bearing.52 In addition, these sectors will not suffer as much from the ab-
sence of the automatic insurance or stabilization inherent in the accretion
tax. In fact, it is likely that an accretion tax would be an ineffective de-
vice in these sectors because individuals and firms would "undo" its risk
sharing properties in advance to the extent desired.
The possibility that a hybrid tax regime might be useful for
macroeconomic purposes stands in contrast to the usual tax theory and
economic view that hybrid schemes are, at best, political conveniences
that create unnecessary economic and legal costs.5 3 The economic costs
come about because mixing income-based and consumption-based taxes
51. One of the best approaches to address the valuation problem is Alan Auerbach's
retrospective capital gains tax scheme. The scheme replicates the ex ante impact of an
accretion tax in a regime where capital gains taxation occurs only upon disposition of an
asset. In particular, assets are taxed as if they grew at the riskless rate of interest to the
value realized at disposition. See Alan J. Auerbach, Retrospective Capital Gains Taxation,
81 AM. ECON. REV. 167, 172 (1991).
This scheme will not have the strong stabilizing impact of an accretion tax. First, there
are no period-by-period rebates or taxes. These rebates and taxes (as opposed to unreal-
ized future tax consequences) are crucial under Keynesian theories that emphasize
shortfalls in aggregate demand arising from nominal rigidities. Second, the Auerbach
scheme removes much of the responsiveness of tax liabilities to macroeconomic outcomes.
Indeed, even after a very severe recession and large losses in securities markets, sale of any
asset will result in a tax liability rather than a deduction or allowance for losses incurred.
52. There is one complexity that is worth mentioning. Sectors in the economy are
linked because the outputs of some sectors are inputs for other sectors, and the best alter-
native employment of factors idled in one sector may be in only one or two particular other
sectors. In short, adjustments imposed on one sector will "overflow" disproportionately to
certain other sectors. In choosing which sectors should bear the brunt of any adjustment, it
is important to consider the interactions between sectors.
53. This conventional viewpoint is not universal. See Edward J. McCaffery, Tax Policy
Under a Hybrid Income-Consumption Tax, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1145 (1992).
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results in intersectoral capital distortions. 54 Too much capital flows into
the sectors subject to consumption-based treatment relative to the sectors
subject to an accretion tax. The legal costs involve the need for the gov-
ernment to define and defend the borderline between the two different
tax regimes. 55
At present, the U.S. tax system is a hybrid. The federal personal tax
has some elements that resemble an accretion tax, other elements that
resemble a realization-based tax, and yet other elements that resemble a
cash flow income tax. In addition, there is a payroll tax with a cap on the
annual income base and an earned income tax credit applicable to lower-
income households. These provisions primarily impact low-income and
middle-income taxpayers. Because these groups are believed to have a
higher marginal propensity to consume than high-income households, au-
tomatic stabilizers or explicit policies aimed at these groups may have a
much stronger stimulative impact.56 Along the same lines, the stabiliza-
tion properties of the mark-to-market component of the accretion tax will
depend on the marginal propensity to consume demonstrated by the
group subject to that tax. Any scheme that groups different people into
different tax sectors must reckon with the potential impact of different
marginal propensities to consume.
III. QUALIFICATIONS AND GOALS FOR
FUTURE RESEARCH
Part II studied the macroeconomic consequences of tax base choice by
relying on a fairly simple Keynesian framework combined with some
speculations about what would happen in a basic neoclassical model. Al-
though this simplified analytic framework is useful for a first-cut concep-
tual approach to the subject, some results may not hold up to deeper
scrutiny. This Part summarizes the results, discusses some obvious short-
comings in the underlying analysis, and briefly outlines some goals for
future research.
A. A SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS
Part II examined three pure tax bases: the accretion tax, a realization-
based tax, and the cash flow income tax. One focus of that Part was on
the mark-to-market feature of the accretion tax. This feature has two
important consequences: The current value of wealth holdings is insu-
lated against any impact from changes in tax rates, and any asset value
fluctuations are offset by the tax increases or reductions that follow from
54. See, e.g., Don Fullerton et al., Replacing the U.S. Income Tax with a Progressive
Consumption Tax, 20 J. PUB. ECON. 3 (1983).
55. For instance, if "farming" is accorded cash flow treatment and "manufacturing"
receives accretion treatment, taxpayers will prefer to have some of their activities classified
as "farming" as opposed to "manufacturing." Classification may not be easy. For example,
is canning fresh food part of the farming process or is it manufacturing?
56. See Auerbach & Feenberg, supra note 19, at 38-39, 45-47.
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mark-to-market treatment. Insulating wealth against tax rate changes
means that fiscal policy (in the form of rate adjustments) will depend
solely on substitution effects. Both the accretion tax and the realization-
based tax lower the after-tax rate of return (relative to the cash flow tax
or no tax). This reduction will tend to lower the saving rate and increase
the marginal propensity to consume with a consequent increase in the
power of monetary policy and fiscal policy in a short-run Keynesian
framework. On the other hand, the tax increases and reductions under
the mark-to-market feature of the accretion tax will tend to offset any
application of fiscal or monetary policy. This offset will be absent under a
realization-based tax.
Changing tax rates under the realization-based tax involves a wealth
effect. In particular, tax rate increases cause an increase in the present
value of wealth holdings. This increase will tend to increase current con-
sumption and leisure and to reduce output in a neoclassical setting.
The cash flow income tax differs sharply from the other two taxes in its
macroeconomic implications. This tax makes fiscal policy potentially very
potent. In particular, temporary tax increases or reductions will have a
powerful impact on aggregate demand. However, the effectiveness of
these increases or reductions will depend on whether the government is
able to make the temporary nature of the tax changes credible.
Even in the absence of the credible application of temporary tax rate
changes, fiscal and monetary policy under a cash flow income tax will
have a non-trivial impact on the present value of wealth holdings. A per-
manent increase in cash flow income tax rates is equivalent to expropria-
tion without compensation of a portion of all private wealth holdings.
Monetary tightening that raises interest rates will have an unshielded
negative impact on the value of private wealth holdings. Under neoclas-
sical models, these wealth impacts will have significant short-run and me-
dium-run macroeconomic effects. On the other hand, in a Keynesian
framework, the higher savings rate under a cash flow income tax will di-
minish the effectiveness of fiscal and monetary policy.
A hybrid system with different tax treatments applied to different in-
dustrial sectors or to different groups of people allows the government to
choose which sectors or groups to burden with the risk of macroeconomic
shocks or the adjustment costs of government policy. Constructing an
effective hybrid approach may be difficult because the (potentially very
complex) interactions between sectors and groups are important.
B. DEEPENING AND EXTENDING THE ANALYSIS
The analysis in Part II suffers from major deficiencies. One problem is
that the various macroeconomic tendencies identified for each tax base
are not comparable. The discussion does not indicate, for instance,
whether the policy-inhibiting nature of the mark-to-mark feature of the
accretion tax is larger or smaller than the policy-enhancing effects of the
lower savings rate that is a by-product of that tax.
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The lack of comparability comes from several sources: The discussion
patches together effects that arise in distinct models based on different
behavioral, empirical, and systemic assumptions. It is worth focusing on
the issues surrounding the mark-to-market feature to illustrate this prob-
lem. In Part II, the IS-LM diagram illustrating the impact of the mark-to-
market features shows an IS curve shift that completely offsets the out-
put-enhancing effects of tighter monetary policy (the LM curve shift). 57
However, it is by no means clear whether the offset would be complete.
The degree of offset depends on the slopes of the IS and LM curves, but
it also depends on assumptions about behavior that dictate how much
each curve shifts. In addition, it is by no means clear whether the IS-LM
model with its implicit dependence on nominal rigidities is an appropriate
framework.
Thinking in neoclassical terms, this situation involves a change in
wealth that is mitigated by a tax rebate. If the tax rate is 40% and the
monetary tightening causes an individual's wealth to fall by $10,000, then
there will be a tax rebate of $4,000. The net effect is to reduce the drop in
wealth from $10,000 to $6,000. In traditional neoclassical models, individ-
uals are assumed to maximize expected utility in an intertemporal frame-
work. The typical response to a drop in wealth would be to reduce
current consumption and leisure. A concomitant increase in interest
rates would induce a substitution effect that would increase saving. The
mark-to-market aspect of the accretion tax would reduce the magnitude
of these effects because it would reduce the drop in wealth that triggers
the changes. But, the impact of the effects would flow in the same
direction.
It may be the case, however, that an individual would respond more
strongly to the $4,000 cash rebate than to the $10,000 drop in the value of
the individual's wealth holdings. This differential response may be ra-
tional. If the individual is liquidity constrained but rational, 58 receiving
the cash releases the constraint and might induce the individual to in-
crease current consumption and leisure, the opposite effect from the situ-
ation with no liquidity constraints.
It is worth noting that liquidity constraints may not be the whole story.
Individuals may spend more easily out of cash receipts because they are
not fully rational or deliberate. A recent study by Nicholas Souleles of
consumption behavior associated with tax refunds suggests that both a
rational response to liquidity constraints and other phenomena that do
57. See supra text accompanying note 28 (IS-LM Diagram IV).
58. "Liquidity constrained" means that capital market imperfections make the individ-
ual unable to borrow against future income or make such borrowing costly. Unconstrained
intertemporal optimization might call for higher consumption and leisure in the present,
but the liquidity constraint prevents the individual from optimizing. When the constraint is
relaxed by an unexpected cash receipt, it may be rational for the individual to consume
that receipt even if it is accompanied by a drop in wealth.
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not easily fit in a rational-maximizing framework are at work.59 This
study finds total short-run consumption from tax refunds to be in the
35% to 60% range, a surprisingly high proportion.
An additional complication involves the differential impact of tax pay-
ments or rebates on parties that differ in wealth or income. Assuming all
individuals are rational, persons high in the wealth or income distribution
are less likely to be liquidity constrained and are more likely to have a
very low marginal propensity to consume out of tax rebates or tax levies.
This propensity may be on the order of the 1% to 5% range estimated for
current consumption out of stock market gains,60 a much lower figure
than the 35% to 60% range found in the Souleles study for tax refunds.
Many forms of wealth are held disproportionately by people at the top of
the wealth distribution, but the pattern varies substantially by type of as-
set. For example, in 1998 for the United States, the top 20% of wealth-
holders held 95.9% of all common stock (including 98.3% of all such
common stock held outside of pensions and other tax-favored vehicles)
but "only" 70.7% of all housing equity.6' The automatic stabilization
properties arising from marking assets to market will be much less salient
if their primary impact is on individuals with low marginal propensity to
consume.
62
When all these additional factors are added to the picture, the final
outcome becomes very unclear. Consider the case discussed above of
monetary restraint under an accretion tax regime: The Fed contracts the
money supply by selling government securities in open market opera-
tions. Interest rates increase, asset values fall, and individuals receive tax
rebates in cash as these assets are marked (down) to market. If individu-
als are completely rational and not liquidity constrained, they will treat
the tax rebates as reducing but not eliminating the drop in wealth and
respond accordingly-reducing consumption and leisure. Output will in-
crease. However, if individuals consume the cash rebates because they
are liquidity constrained or because they (irrationally) treat cash receipts
and payments differently from unrealized wealth changes, then the result
may be very different. Consumption and leisure may increase, causing
output to drop. The actual outcome depends on two factors. First, the
distribution of wealth is important since this distribution determines the
proportion of the population that is liquidity constrained. Second, it mat-
ters whether a significant number of people who are not liquidity con-
strained have an irrationally high propensity to consume out of available
cash.
59. Nicholas S. Souleles, The Response of Household Consumption to Income Tax Re-
funds, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 947, 956 (1999). See also, Auerbach & Feenberg, supra note 19,
at 45 (discussing the literature).
60. See James M. Poterba, Stock Market Wealth and Consumption, 1 J. ECON. PERSP.
99, 107 (2000).
61. See id. at 102 (Table 2).
62. For a very good discussion of the impact of differential marginal propensities to
consume on automatic stabilization under current U.S. tax law, see Auerbach & Feenberg,
supra note 19.
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It is clear that addressing the issues raised in Part II requires more
explicit and sophisticated modeling that will make the contingent nature
of the results more apparent and that will allow incorporation of more
institutional and structural elements into the analysis. 63
63. Another important extension is to embed the interaction of a nation's tax base and
macroeconomic policy in an international setting. Adding international elements to the
picture can greatly affect the nature of that interaction. See, e.g., MAURICE OBSTFELD &
KENNETH ROGOFF, FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL MACROECONOMICS (1996).
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